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ABSTRACT 
Title of Dissertation:    A Study on the Effectiveness of the ISM Code on the 
Seafarers' Awareness of Safety Culture 
 
Degree:              MSc 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore whether the ISM Code is effective in 
promoting maritime safety culture. This dissertation measures seafarers’ perceptions 
of safety culture by distinguishing seafarers employed in ocean-going vessels 
applying the Code from those in domestic vessels not applying the Code. Through a 
comparison of the level of the consciousness of the two groups of seafarers on safety 
culture, it is possible to verify the effectiveness of the Code on safety culture. The 
dissertation assumes that the implementation of the Code impacts positively on safety 
culture. 
To measure seafarers’ awareness of safety culture, a questionnaire including 43 
items based on seven safety culture indicators was developed through a review of the 
relevant literature. A survey was conducted of Korean seafarers, and 208 responses 
were used for analysis. 
The result showed that there were significant differences between the perceptions 
of safety culture between the two groups in organisational commitment, management 
involvement, reporting system, learning and reward system, and it was confirmed that 
the consciousness level of seafarers employed on ocean going vessels on these 
factors was high. Nevertheless, there were no significant differences between the two 
groups in employee empowerment and communication, so the Code could partly 
affect safety culture.  
In this dissertation, the effectiveness of the ISM Code was verified by quantitative 
measurement of the perception of safety culture by Korean seafarers. This study is 
meaningful because it carried out empirical measurement of safety culture and it is 
expected that it can contribute to the establishment of measures to enhance safety 
culture. 
KEYWORDS: Safety culture, Safety climate, ISM, effectiveness, seafarer 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
   
Since the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), which was formally known as 
the IMCO, was established in 1948, the IMO and its Member States have been 
contributing to prevent accidents at sea through developing and improving rules and 
regulations related not only to hardware such as ships’ hull design, stability and 
equipment but also human resources such as seafarers. Although these efforts have 
resulted in substantial improvements in the reliability of ships’ hardware as well as the 
quality of crews, maritime incidents are still a major concern for the shipping 
community (Rothblum, 2000; Ceyhun, 2014).     
It has been shown in many studies that more than 80% of maritime accidents are 
caused by human error, for instance, failure of situational awareness, mistakes, slips 
and violations of regulations by crews on ships. However, at a deeper level, it can be 
seen that there are problems with organizational climate and management (KTSA, 
2008).  
From the late 1980s to the 1990s, major catastrophes occurred at Sea, for instance, 
the Herald of Free Enterprise, a ro-ro passenger ferry, capsized in the Dover Strait 
with loss of 193 lives in 1987, the Exxon Valdez, a very large crude oil tanker, 
grounded in Alaska in 1989, and another ro-ro passenger ferry, the Estonia, sank in 
the Baltic Sea with loss of 852 lives and only 137 survivors in 1994 (Jung, 2016). 
Through the analysis of these accidents, it is understood that human error was the 
direct cause (Lee, 2016). At the same time, it has been found through accident 
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investigations that deficiencies in safety culture lie in the management of companies' 
employees and ships’ crews (Lappalainen, 2016). These accidents remind the 
international community of the importance of the human element and the need to 
promote safety culture to ensure maritime safety. 
With the perception of the importance of the safety culture in the maritime sector, 
the IMO has established measures to promote safety culture on ships. In 1994, the 
International Safety Management System (ISM) Code was implemented by the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and was promoted by 
the IMO with the safety culture on the maritime industries including ships and in ship 
owners (IMO, 2013; Anderson, 2015). In August 2016, the Secretary-General of IMO 
deemed that the Code was considered as the measure designed to directly influence 
maritime safety culture at a conference in Singapore (IMO, 2016).  
The IMO set the objective of the ISM Code “to ensure safety at sea, prevention of 
human injury or loss of life and avoidance of damage to the marine environment (IMO, 
1993, p.5)”. The Code includes provisions for establishing Safety Management 
System (SMS) to ships and ship owners to prevent human errors by assessing and 
identifying all risks and managing them.  
According to the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the safety culture can be 
described as “the values and practices that management and personnel share to 
ensure that risks are always minimized and mitigated to the greatest degree possible. 
(ICS, 2013, p.2)” The safety culture makes employees of shipping companies possible 
to improve their behaviour by allowing them to think and act based on safety and 
share a value of safety; thereby, it can bring enhancement of safety. Furthermore, the 
safety culture is essential for ships operation that is constantly exposed to potential 
risks, and it also an essential virtue required for personnel performing on-board 
operations and staff working for shipping companies. 
The safety culture was considered very important not only in the shipping sector 
but also in other industries. Prior to the introduction of safety culture in the maritime 
sector, the term “safety culture” was first used by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) following the Soviet Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986. In the aviation 
field, safety culture has been studied since the NASA Challenger accident in 1986 
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and the Continental Express Flight 2574 accident in 1991 (von Thaden & Gibbons, 
2008). Therefore, several studies have been carried out to assess safety culture, 
focusing on aviation pilots and traffic management operators.  
In order to improve maritime safety, it is necessary to obtain an understanding of 
the detailed concepts of safety culture and establish a concrete approach to the safety 
culture. Therefore, a tool to assess the perception of safety culture can be a good 
measure to understand the characteristics of an organization, and make it possible to 
find a specific prescription to enhance safety culture. 
Seafarers should work based on the perception that safety is the best way to 
prevent human error. It can be prevented by crews having high alertness about safety 
and an organizational culture should be promoted. Therefore, assessing seafarers’ 
awareness of safety culture can be a more active measure to prevent accidents on 
ships. In order to survey the awareness of the safety culture of the seafarers, it is 
important to apply an adequate tool that can be assessed quantitatively using 
reasonable indicators, and there are several studies to estimate seafarers’ awareness 
of safety culture.  
With regard to the ISM Code, there is a question to whether the application of the 
Code has improved the awareness of safety culture of ship workers. As the Code has 
been enforced over the last two decades, many research and studies have evaluated 
the effectiveness of the ISM code. The IMO has also studied the impact of the ISM 
Code, which was introduced at eighty-first session of the Maritime Safety Committee 
(MSC) in 2006 (IMO, 2016). The study (IMO, 2005) found that the Code contributed 
to the enhancement of safety culture with positive benefits, and one of the 
recommendations was that further study was needed for the improvement of the Code 
reflecting safety culture. However, there were some studies relating negative effects 
of the Code. For instance, Bhattacharya (2012) argued that there were substantial 
gaps between seafarers’ and managers’ perception on the Code (Jung, 2016). 
In the above previous studies, the perceived effectiveness of the ISM Code was 
measured by asking respondents’ opinions about the implementation of the Code 
through interviews or questionnaires. However, this study will develop a questionnaire 
based on indicators for measuring safety culture, and the effectiveness of the Code 
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will be measured specifically based on the indicators by conducting surveys targeting 
crews working on the Code applied ships and non-applied ships.  
Through this study, it is possible to understand the perception of the safety culture 
of seafarers, and to measure the level of safety culture on ships that apply and do not 
apply the ISM Code, so that the effectiveness of the ISM to the safety culture can be 
estimated. Furthermore, it is possible to compare and analyse its effectiveness based 
on the safety indicators, and it will be possible to identify the factors that need 
improvement to enhance the performance of ISM. 
 
1.2 Objectives 
 
This study aims to show a correlation between seafarers’ awareness of safety 
culture and ISM Code. Specifically, it aims to establish whether seafarers who are 
working on ships applying the ISM Code have a high level of consciousness of safety 
culture. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the Code in terms of promoting safety 
culture will be assessed based on indicators. In addition, the perception of the safety 
culture of seafarers will be compared and analysed based on the indicators by 
distinguishing crews working on the Code applied and non- the Code applied vessels.  
For that purpose, the concept of safety culture will be examined in this study and 
optimum tool will be developed to assess seafarers’ perception of maritime safety 
culture. Therefore, this dissertation: 
 Studies the concept of safety culture by examining past studies in the 
aviation field and shipping industry.  
 Collects safety indicators for the assessment of safety culture based on 
past similar studies of aviation and the maritime sector. 
 Analyses elements of the ISM Code and the safety culture indicators, and 
develops optimum safety indicators, and develops a questionnaire based 
on the safety indicators. 
 Surveys more than two hundred Korean seafarers who are working on 
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international and domestic ships using questionnaires. And analyses the 
results using SPSS. 
 Analyses the characteristics of the awareness of Korean seafarers and 
examines the correlation between ISM and the safety culture. 
 
1.3 The structure of the dissertation 
    
This study consists of seven chapters. Chapter one includes the background, the 
objectives and the structure of the thesis. 
Chapter two will conduct a literature review related to the development of the 
concept of safety culture and relevant research to assess safety culture in the aviation 
and maritime fields. Furthermore, studies in terms of the effectiveness of the ISM 
Code will be reviewed.   
Chapter three will examine the background, the role and the function of the ISM 
Code and elements of the Code. In addition, the implementation of the Code in Korea 
will be shown.   
Chapter four will show the hypothesis and the methodology for this study. As the 
main hypothesis, the correlation between safety culture and the ISM will be suggested. 
With this hypothesis, other sub-hypotheses will be added in order to grasp the 
characteristics of Korean seafarers' perceptions of safety culture. Moreover, the 
design of the questionnaire will be shown in this chapter. 
Chapter five contains an empirical analysis, which describes the characteristics of 
the data, evaluation of measurement items, and hypothesis testing. The collected 
questionnaires are analysed by using IBM SPSS Statistic 20, and analysis of 
frequencies, factors, reliabilities and t-test are conducted in order to enhance the 
objectivity of the research. 
Chapter six will provide the discussion of findings, conclusion, and limitation of the 
study and future topics.  
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Figure 1 Process of the study 
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2. THEORETICAL REVIEW OF SAFETY CULTURE 
 
2.1 Historical background of safety culture 
 
The term safety culture was first introduced in the report of the Post-Accident 
Review Meeting written after the Chernobyl Accident by the International Nuclear 
Safety Group in 1986. According to the report, the IAEA indicated that the major cause 
of the nuclear power station accident was derived from a “poor safety culture” in the 
Soviet Union (IAEA, 1991).  
 Following the Chernobyl accident, a series of several major catastrophes occurred, 
for instance, a fire on the King’s Cross underground in 1987 and an explosion on the 
oil production platform, Piper Alpha, in 1988. The main causes of these accidents 
were also referred to as poor safety culture (Cox & Flin, 1998; Pidgeon, 1998: KTSA, 
2008). Meanwhile, the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger in 1987 brought 
attention to safety culture in aviation. In addition, the Continental Express Flight 2574 
crash occurred in 1991, also raising concerns about safety culture (von Thaden & 
Gibbons, 2008). The NTSB (1991) noted that “The failure of Continental Express 
Flight 2574’s management to establish a corporate culture which encouraged and 
enforced adherence to approved maintenance and quality assurance 
procedures”(p.54). Since this accident, the commercial aviation industry has 
conducted a number of studies related to safety culture (von Thaden & Gibbons, 
2008).  
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In the maritime field, safety culture has also begun to be recognized following a 
number of large-scale marine accidents, just as in the other industries. On 6th March 
1987, the ro-ro passenger ferry Herald of free enterprise capsized in four minutes just 
after its departure, and there was a loss of 193 lives. This catastrophe brought about 
full attention to safety culture in the maritime industry. Gill and Wahner (2012) and 
Lappalainen (2016) indicated that the Herald of free enterprise, which was operated 
by Townsend Car Ferries Limited, had a lack of safety culture among the ship’s crews 
as well as the shore-based management. Moreover, the shore-side managers of the 
ferry had always forced the crew to leave five minutes early from ports. On the day of 
the incident, there was a hasty departure due to delayed shipments. At the time of the 
departure of the ferry, the chief officer should have confirmed that the bow door of the 
ship was closed. However, due to the climate of the company's management to make 
a fast departure, he had to be on the navigational bridge. This climate of the 
company’s management resulted in the chief officer’s mistake of failing to ensure that 
the bow door was closed. Several months before the accident occurred, the master 
asked the manager of the shipping company to install a means to indicate the closed 
or open position of the bow doors, but the communication between the shore-based 
manager and the master was not effective. It resulted from the corporate culture that 
seeks to benefit rather than protect (Gill & Wahner, 2012).  
Seven years following the Herald of Free Enterprise accident, another serious 
maritime accident that raised awareness about safety culture occurred in the Baltic 
Sea. On 28 September 1994, the car ferry Estonia capsized and sank due to a 
separation of its bow visor in the rough sea. From the accident, 852 people died or 
were missing and only 137 people survived. The direct cause was the separation of 
the bow visor, which pulled off the watertight ramp behind it. After that, a huge amount 
of water flooded into the ferry. According to the report of the Joint Accident 
Investigation Commission (1997), prior to the Estonia accident, there had been 
numerous failures involving bow visors on similar types of ships, which were 
constructed at similar times, including one of the Estonia’s sister ships. However, 
there had been no systematic remedies for existing ro-ro passenger ferries. Since 
information or reports about those failures were not shared, the crew and master of 
the Estonia were unaware of the potential dangers to the bow visor closure (JAIC, 
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1997).  
Safety culture has been introduced and studied to ensure safe working environment 
and to prevent an accident as an important concept to manage risks in various 
industries (Berg, 2013). It is clear that the importance of safety culture gains 
recognition following a major disaster in any industry. If a safety culture is lacking in 
any organisation, such as a ship or a company, it would be very difficult to manage 
risk factors, and the lack of management can lead to major accidents.  
 
2.2 Concept of safety culture and safety climate 
 
The definition of safety culture has been studied since the 1980s following the 
occurrence of the Chernobyl disaster. Firstly, the IAEA (1991) defined safety culture 
as “Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations 
and individuals which establish that, as an overriding priority, protection and safety 
issues receive the attention warranted by their significance. (p.4)” Since then, there 
have been many areas that deal with safety culture; however, there has been no 
consensual definition of safety culture (Guldenmund, 2000; Wiegmann, Zhang, von 
Thaden, Sharma & Mitchell, 2002). Many attempts have been made to define safety 
climate, along with studies on the definition of safety culture.  
Zhang, Wiegmann, and von Thaden (2002) conducted comprehensive reviews on 
the concept of safety culture, along with safety climate, to better understand safety 
culture. The study analysed a total of 107 documents and papers, and 30 articles 
related to safety culture and safety climate.  
According to the study (Zhang et al. 2002), safety culture was defined as the flowing: 
The enduring value and priority placed on worker and public safety by everyone in 
every group at every level of an organization. It refers to the extent to which 
individuals and groups will commit to personal responsibility for safety; act to 
preserve, enhance and communicate safety concerns; strive to actively learn, 
adapt and modify (both individual and organizational) behaviour based on lessons 
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learned from mistakes; and be rewarded in a manner consistent with these values. 
(p. 1406) 
Furthermore, Zhang et al. (2002) defined safety climate as the flowing: 
The temporal state measure of safety culture, subject to commonalities among 
individual perceptions of the organization. It is therefore situationally based, 
refers to the perceived state of safety at a particular place at a particular time, is 
relatively unstable, and subject to change depending on the features of the 
current environment or prevailing conditions. (p.1406) 
Bhattacharya (2015) argued that there were differences between the concepts of 
safety culture and safety climate. Safety culture comes from inherent historical 
contexts or organizational operations, values, and traditions, and is formed over a 
long period (Cooper, 2000). On the other hand, safety climate is affected by the 
environment and the situation. By analogy, the safety climate can be relatively 
unstable and instantaneous, with the concept of a snapshot of the safety culture 
(Bhattacharya, 2015).  
Safety culture is an inherent belief in a somewhat deeper core shared among its 
members and is expressed through a safety climate. In other words, if the safety 
climate is the environment in which the organization is located at that time, the safety 
culture is the nature of the organization (Cox & Flin, 1998). Therefore, most of the 
facts about safety culture are also true of safety climate (Guldenmund, 2000; Oltedal, 
2011).  
To sum up, safety climate has been assessed in many other studies. Measuring the 
current safety climate will identify a cross-section of the safety culture that the 
contemporary society or organisation has. By diagnosing the current state, it is 
believed that it will be possible to grasp what elements the current organisation or 
society has and what elements it can improve. Therefore, the safety culture should be 
recognised through measuring the safety climate in an organisation or society 
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2.3 ISM Code and safety culture 
 
According to the ISM Code, Ship Management System (SMS), which refers to a 
structured and documented system designed to ensure that a company’s employees 
can implement its policies for the safe operation of ships and the protection of the 
marine environment (IMO, 2013), shall be applied to ships. Moreover, the IMO 
encourages the establishment of a safety culture in the shipping sector through the 
establishment of the SMS (Anderson, 2015; IMO, 2013; Kongsvik, Størkersen, & 
Antonsen, 2014; Schröder-Hinrichs, 2010).  
The question has been raised as to what constitutes a good safety culture. 
Promoting safety culture can be effective to enhance the safety of an organisation 
(Lee, 2012). Wiegmann et al. (2002) identified the following features as to what is a 
“good” safety culture (Lappalanine, 2016). There are five organisational indicators of 
safety culture: “organizational commitment, management involvement, employee 
empowerment, reward systems, and reporting system” (Wiegmann et al., 2002, p.11).  
The organizational commitment means upper-level management to promote safety 
culture. Practically, it entails a persistent attitude to safety, and adequate funding and 
allocation of resources for the development and implementation of safety (Wiegmann 
et al., 2002).  
 
Figure 2 Indicators of safety culture 
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Management involvement refers to the degree to which senior management and 
middle managers are directly involved in important safety activities within the 
organization. This includes good communication between the top and bottom 
(Wiegmann et al., 2002).  
Employee empowerment is the last defence to prevent errors by preventing worker 
errors (e.g. pilot) in the field. Organizations that have a good safety culture should 
delegate authority to employees to encourage them to actively participate and play 
an important role in promoting safety (Wiegmann et al., 2002).  
Eiff (1999, p. 17) indicated that “One of the foundations of a true safety culture is 
that it is a reporting culture.” The reporting system is a system for reporting 
incompatible elements and errors. It focuses on whether employees are encouraged 
to report safety issues without any difficulties, and whether they are well 
communicated (Wiegmann et al., 2002).   
The reward system is necessary to establish an organizational culture, and both 
safe acts and unsafe acts need to be evaluated. A fair evaluation system will promote 
safety culture. Organizations with a good safety culture should look to ensure that the 
distinction between safe and unsafe behaviour is clear and has a clear and correct 
system of punishment (Wiegmann et al., 2002). 
Lappalainen (2016) argued that the list of indicators developed by Wiegmann et al. 
(2002) does not clearly present a “continuous improvement process”, but stated that 
the reporting and rewarding system could be used as a practical tool for that purpose. 
Furthermore, Lappalainen (2016) indicated that there is no doubt that the 
characteristics of a good safety culture are implemented in the Code like a religious 
position.  
Since the implementation of the ISM Code in 1994, considerable research has been 
conducted to study the effectiveness of the ISM code for improving maritime safety. 
This maritime safety promotion is also closely linked to the improvement of maritime 
safety culture. This is because the IMO anticipated that the ISM Code would enhance 
the safety culture of ship and ship owners (IMO, 2016).  
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A group of experts set up by the IMO surveyed to measure the effectiveness of the 
ISM Code, and a total of 3,109 respondents answered the questionnaire (IMO, 2005). 
An analysis by the expert groups showed that the ISM Code worked properly on ships 
and in shipping companies and improved maritime safety management positively. 
Furthermore, it showed that safety culture was promoted by implementing the ISM 
Code as the majority of respondents (96 to 99 percent) evaluated the ISM Code 
positively. However, the expert group noted that the survey was voluntary so 
respondents who participated in the survey had a positive attitude toward the ISM 
Code. Therefore, the survey had a limitation, whereby an overwhelmingly positive 
evaluation would have been made due to respondents who had positive attitudes to 
the survey (IMO, 2005).  
Although the IMO determined that the evaluation of the effectiveness of the Code 
was positive, there have been several studies to suggest the implementation of the 
Code has negative aspects (Lappalainen, 2016). Bharttacharya (2011) indicated that 
managers had been bureaucratically applying the ISM Code by directing and 
enforcing guidelines to crew members in a top-down manner in implementing safety 
management. The crews applied their own experiences rather than using the ISM 
Code to conduct safe shipboard operations (Bhattacharya, 2012). These are the 
reasons why the effectiveness of the Code seems to be negative in the study. Besides, 
Anderson (2003) argued that the Code requires a lot of documentation on the part of 
seafarers, so it can be burdensome and complex, and Knudsen (2009) and Batalden 
and Sydnes (2014) noted that documents and procedures under the ISM Code are 
effectively applied to real work of seafarers. In addition, Bhattacharya (2012) noted 
that there was a considerable difference in the recognition of the crew members and 
the ship managers about the performance and execution of the ISM Code. 
A recent study conducted interviews and observation on personnel's conceptions 
of SMS and safety culture. Lappalainen (2016) scrutinised the views of personnel on 
the impact of the ISM Code on maritime safety culture. As a result, perception of 
safety culture was influenced by the ISM Code, but the effect seemed not to be strong. 
Some interviewees had positive thinking on the SMS, and believed that the 
implementation of ISM Code brought substantial benefits (Lappalainen 2016). 
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However, there were negative views on the effectiveness of incident reporting and 
documentation. 
In Korea, the safety culture of seafarers has not been comprehensively studied. A 
survey of seafarers' perceptions about safety culture was conducted. Kim (2013) 
found that there were no differences in safety culture awareness among seafarers of 
different ship types and ranks, and the main survey items were related to the 
responsibility and attitude toward safety of seafarers. Furthermore, compliance with 
the ISM Code can contribute to the promotion of safety culture.  
In summary, most studies that have been conducted in the past have been related 
to the definition and concept of safety culture, and there have been few studies on the 
relationship between Safety Culture and the ISM Code (Guldenmund, 2010: 
Lappalainen, 2016). In addition, research on the effectiveness of the ISM Code itself 
has been conducted, but studies on whether it contributes to safety culture are not 
sufficient. In particular, there are no studies that quantitatively measure the 
effectiveness of the ISM Code on safety culture. 
 
2.4 Approaches and related studies to assess safety culture 
 
Since safety culture is covered in many fields such as nuclear power, road, railway, 
manufacturing and aviation, various research and evaluation methods exist. 
Furthermore, due to the importance of safety culture, many studies have been 
conducted to define and to assess safety culture (Wiegmann et al., 2002). Therefore, 
there is no standardised measurement tool that can be applied to all industrial fields 
(Cox & Flin, 1998). 
To research safety culture, there have been many ways to evaluate safety culture 
depending on the approach. Guldenmund (2010) indicated three approaches to the 
research of safety culture as shown in Table 1. First, the analytical approach is 
commonly applied to an assessment of safety culture, and questionnaires are utilised 
for this approach. Second, a pragmatic approach aims to assess the maturity of the 
safety culture of an organisation and tries to find a way to improve the current status 
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of the culture. The last approach is an academic approach which is mainly conducted 
as a qualitative study, and it aims to grasp the status of a culture through interviews, 
observations and document studies (Guldenmund, 2010).  
In recent years, combining these three approaches has been considered as useful 
in interpreting the concept of safety culture and understanding the safety 
management system. It would not be accurate to say that one method is perfect. By 
combining these approaches, one might be able to interpret the concepts of safety 
culture and apply them usefully to understanding the safety management system 
(Guldenmund, 2010).  
As to methods of measurement of safety culture, Wiegmann et al. (2002) indicated 
that they could be practically divided into qualitative and quantitative methods as 
shown in Table 2. On the one hand, qualitative methods can be comprised of 
employee observation, focus group discussion, historical information review, and case 
studies. Through qualitative methodologies, deep and intensive information can be 
obtained based on the content discussed (Wiegmann et al., 2002). On the other hand, 
the quantitative approach measures safety culture by using standardized and 
coordinated procedures - interviews, surveys and questionnaires (Wiegmann et al., 
2002). The culture can be assessed through a questionnaire, including safety factors 
or indicators, and it is easy to acquire people’s perceptions of the culture.  
Table 1 Guldenmund (2010)'s approaches for study on safety culture edited by author 
Approach objectives Tools & methodology Feature 
Analytical Psychological safety 
climate 
Questionnaires 
- Quantitative methodology 
Grasping the 
present culture 
Pragmatic Assessment of the 
safety culture maturity 
of an organisation 
Q-sort or rating scales for 
making appraisals 
Expert opinions 
Experience-
based approach 
Academic Understanding or 
describing a culture 
Interviews, case study, 
observations or 
documentation 
Focusing on  
core of the 
culture 
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- Qualitative methodology  
Each method has advantages and disadvantages. The qualitative approach can 
analyse and answer the internal factors through an in-depth approach to the questions 
and discussions, while the results can be biased according to the analyst's opinion. 
The quantitative approach can analyse the perception of the climate objectively by 
asking the opinions of the respondents through standardized questionnaires; however, 
it is difficult to analyse the responses of the participants in depth.  
To assess safety climate, safety dimensions such as factors are needed. There 
have been several studies for developing tools to evaluate the level of safety culture 
in the aviation sector. The Korea Transportation Safety Authority [KTSA] (2008) 
conducted an assessment of safety culture and developed an index of safety culture 
for measuring the safety culture awareness level of aviation pilots. The survey 
developed a questionnaire utilizing the commercial aviation safety survey (CASS) 
scale which was developed by Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharman, and Gibbon 
(2003). Furthermore, the study utilised the indicators which were organisation 
commitment, management involvement, reward system, employee empowerment 
and reporting system. The CASS’s questionnaire originally contained 86 questions, 
but the KTSA limited their questionnaire to 46 questions due to realistic constraints 
such as pilots’ hectic schedule.  
Table 2 Measurement of safety culture (Wiegmann et al., 2002; Lee, 2012) 
Division Tools & Methodologies 
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Wang and Sun (2012) proposed a new index system for safety culture evaluation 
and showed its effectiveness and application for the assessment of safety culture at 
intrinsic and extrinsic levels, with seven sub-culture components: priority, 
standardizing, flexibility, learning, teamwork, reporting and just culture. Their survey, 
using a questionnaire, was carried out targeting a local aviation operator in Tanjin, 
China.  
Song (2014) assessed safety climate in the aviation sector, targeting 30 traffic 
management operators and 25 pilots using a questionnaire with 50 questions. Safety 
factors developed by the Civil Air Navigation Service Organisation (CANSO) were 
utilised in the study. The factors were management skill, attitude, resource 
management, learning, communication, organisational structure, and management of 
change. 
With regard to studies on assessment of maritime safety culture, Ek, Runefores and 
Borell (2013) conducted a study to assess the safety culture of six passenger ships. 
The study developed nine aspects of safety culture: flexibility, risk perception, 
behaviour, reporting, work situation, justness, attitudes, learning, communication and 
safety culture. The study presented the relationships between the nine aspects though 
using a questionnaire targeting crew working onboard the passenger ships. 
Bhattacharya (2015) carried out research to grasp the difference in perception of 
safety culture between seafarers, shore managers and ship owners. Among the 
seafarers, junior and senior officers' perception was also compared. In this study, five 
experts participated in the development of a questionnaire, and finally, all 19 items 
were used for the measurement of safety. In addition, the study analysed the 
correlation between the 19 items and seven safety drivers which were support on 
Qualitative Measurement - Observation 
- Focus group discussion 
- Historical Information review 
- Case study 
Quantitative measurement -Structured interview 
-Questionnaire 
-Q-sorts 
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safety, organisation support, resource availability, work environment, job demands, 
just culture and safety compliance.   
 Moreover, Arslan, Kurt, Turan and Wolff (2016) determined that safety culture could 
be scored on ten safety factors to assess safety culture for maritime organisations. 
The factors were developed based on the index for measuring safety culture 
developed by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS, 2012). The factors were 
communication, employer employee trust, feedback, involvement, mutual trust, 
problem identification, promotion of safety, responsiveness, safety awareness and 
training and competence. They utilised the index of ABS’s model as a basis for their 
questionnaire. To develop the questionnaire, a meticulous literature review was 
carried out, and the developed questionnaire, including 85 questions, was tested by 
experts. The survey was administered to both shore staff and crew members. 
The above-listed studies mainly used a quantitative methodology, and it was found 
that various dimensions of safety culture were utilized for the survey. Table 3 
summarizes the safety-related dimensions used in the studies. It can be seen that 
various dimensions have been utilised in the aviation and maritime sectors.  
 
Division Study Survey target Dimensions or features 
Aviation KTSA (2008) 248 pilots Organisation commitment, 
management involvement, reward 
system, employee empowerment and 
reporting system. 
Wang & Sun 
(2012) 
123 civil aviation 
operators  
Priority, standardizing, flexible, 
learning, teamwork, reporting and 
just culture 
Song (2014) 30 traffic 
management 
operators and 25 
pilots 
Skill, attitude, resource management, 
learning, communication, 
organisational structure, 
management of change. 
Shipping  
Sector 
Ek et al. 
(2013) 
528 seafarers on six 
Swedish passenger 
ships  
Flexibility, risk perception, behaviour, 
reporting, work situation, justness, 
attitudes, learning, communication 
and safety culture 
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Table 3 Summaries of safety culture dimensions edited by the author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. ISM CODE 
 
In the previous chapter, a relationship of the ISM Code and safety culture was 
reviewed. A concept and a structure of the Code will be shown in this chapter. 
Furthermore, the current stage of the implementation of the ISM Code carried out and 
the problems faced by Korean shipping, such as a status of maritime accidents, will 
be explained. 
 
3.1 The concept of the ISM Code  
 
For an importance of human factor and a promotion of a safety culture in the 
maritime sector, the ISM Code was adopted by resolution A.741 (18) at the 18th 
Bhattacharya 
(2015) 
433 Indian seafarers Safety, organisation support, resource 
availability, work environment, job 
demands, just culture and safety 
compliance.   
Arslan, Kurt, 
Turan and 
Wolff (2016) 
70 respondents of 
shore staffs and 
seafarers  
Communication, employer employee 
trust, feedback, involvement, mutual 
trust, problem identification, 
promotion of safety, responsiveness, 
safety awareness and training and 
competence. 
ABS (2012) This was published 
as guidance for a 
survey 
Communication, empowerment, 
feedback, mutual trust, problem 
identification, promotion of safety, 
responsiveness, safety awareness 
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General Assembly of the IMO in 1993. At first, however, the Code was not a 
mandatory measure. Therefore, the IMO has enforced the Code through the 
establishment of Chapter 9 of the 1974/78 SOLAS Convention for the full and 
immediate implementation of the ISM Code in May 1994. Since 1998, the ISM Code 
has been phased into all the ratifying countries of the 1974/78 SOLAS Convention, 
and since July 1, 1998, all passenger ships and over 500 tons of oil tankers, chemical 
tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers and high-speed cargo ships. In addition, the Code 
has been applied to mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs) over 500 tons since 1 July 
2002 (IMO, 2013).  
The ISM Code requires shipping companies to establish a safety management 
system for offshore department and ships and maintain their level above certain 
international standards. To this end, direct involvement of top management in the 
company and the responsibilities, abilities, Motivation is being encouraged. The SMS 
in the Code is used in the ISO 9000 family of quality management systems. In other 
words, while the ISO 9000 family quality management system is intended to improve 
the quality of the product, the SMS aims to ensure safety of ships and prevention of 
marine pollution. These objectives have pursued through software including Quality 
Management System (QMS) and SMS (MLTM, 2010).  
In addition, according to the Code, the flag state or the Recognised Organisation 
(RO) issues to the shipping company to ensure good SMS after the audit. A Document 
of Compliance (DOC) is issued to the ship owner and a Safety Management 
Certificate (SMC) is issued to the ship. The Code is implemented through periodical 
audit, and the contents of the SMS and the validity of the certificate is checked in the 
inspection of the Port State Control (PSC). 
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According to the Code, establishing a SMS shall be documented in the form of 
procedures or manuals for all duties of vessels and shore based operations carried 
out for safe navigation of ships. Furthermore, it is institutionalised so that the main 
duties may be carried out by the documented system. It means establishing a system 
that can check the implementation processes and identify irrelevant matters for 
correcting defects. Therefore, it is ideal that the system document has a hierarchical 
structure as shown in figure 3. Furthermore, twelve elements have been established 
as mandatory in the part A of the ISM Code as following Table 4.  
  
 Manuals 
Procedures 
Instructions 
Figure 3 Layer of document of safety management system 
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Table 4 Elements of ISM Code (IMO, 2013) 
Number Title of each element   
2 Safety and environmental policy 
3 Company responsibility and authority 
4 Designated persons 
5 Master’s responsibility and authority 
6 Resource and personnel 
7 Shipboard operations 
8 Emergency preparedness 
9 
Reports and analysis of Non-Conformities, accidents 
and hazardous occurrences 
10 Maintenance of the ship and equipment 
11 Documentation 
12 Company verification, review and evaluation 
 
3.2 Implementation of the ISM Code in Korea 
 
With the enforcement of the ISM Code, the Korean government revised the 
Maritime Traffic Safety Act on Feb. 8, 1999 to establish the safety management 
system over ships flying the Korean flag and ship owners. The procedures for the 
SMS were in Section 2 of the Act. In the SOLAS Convention, the ISM Code is applied 
to all passenger ships engaged on international voyages, oil tankers, gas carriers, 
chemical carriers, bulk carriers and high-speed cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and 
above, and this application standard was reflected in in the Korean Maritime Traffic 
Safety Act. On June 15, 2011, the Act was revised and promulgated to the Maritime 
Safety Act (MLTM, 2010).   
According to Article 46 of the Act, the Minister of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) shall 
establish and manage policies for a ship owner and ships through the establishment 
of the SMS to enhance safe operation of the ship. The implementation of the ISM 
Code in Korea aims to maintain the level of safety management of ship owners and 
vessels above certain international standards, and calls for direct participation of top 
management in the enterprise as well as the responsibility, competence, attitude and 
motivation of all stakeholders. However, such a purpose will be achieved on vessels 
engaged in international voyages. This is because a more simplified SMS is applied 
to vessels engaged in domestic voyages. Therefore, for domestic vessels, an SMS 
that meets international standards does not apply. 
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Since the oil spill accident of the Very Large Crude Oil Carrier (VLCC) Hebei sprit, 
caused by a collision of crane barges towed by tugs on Dec. 7, 2007, there was a 
recognition of the necessity to apply the SMS to barges. Therefore, the relevant 
domestic regulation has been more stringently enforced compared to SOLAS. 
According to the Act, barges over 3,000 gross tons or tugs towing with lines more than 
100 meters were included in the scope of the application of the SMS. Therefore, the 
application of the Act is as follows (NLIC, 2015). 
a) Ships engaged in maritime passenger transportation business (except for the 
domestic passenger transport business and the inner port passenger transport 
business) 
b) Vessels of at least 500 gross tons (including barges tightly combined with 
steamers), which engage in marine cargo transportation services, and other 
vessels as prescribed by the Presidential Decree 
c) Carriers transporting catches of fish and mobile offshores with a gross tonnage 
of 500 tons or more engaged in international voyages  
d) Wig crafts 
Furthermore, the Korean SMC shall contain the eleven elements in accordance with 
Article 46 (4) of the Act. However, under Article 15 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of 
the same Act, a simplified SMS can be established in the case of a domestic vessel, 
through exempting some of the 11 elements. As the ISM code was legislated to the 
domestic Act, the elements of the Code were thoroughly reflected in the Act.  
Ships and ship owners applying the ISM Code should be audited to prove that an 
SMS is well maintained. In Korea, the audit procedure has been established in Article 
48 of the Act. According to the Act, the audits for vessels engaged in international 
voyages are carried out by the Korean Register of shipping (KR) as a RO, and the 
audits for ships engaged mainly in domestic voyages are handled directly by the 
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Regional Offices (MAFRO). Table 5 shows the results 
of certification audit for Korean shipping companies. 
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Table 5 Audit status of SMS and DOC on Dec 31, 2009 (MLTM, 2010) 
Division 
Shipping companies 
audited 
Ships audited 
Audit 
organisation 
International voyages 137 678 KR 
Domestic voyages 128 293 MAFRO 
 
 
3.3 Challenges faced in Korean shipping society 
 
The seaborne trade and shipbuilding industries have played a pivotal role in the 
Korean economy. As of 2016, the total world fleet of the world’s top 30 shipping 
countries was recorded as 1,657 million Dead Weight Tonnage (DWT), and Korea 
ranked fifth in the world, with a total 85.9 million tons (MOF, 2016). Table 7 shows the 
status of Korean Flagged ships. Over the past five years, the overall number of 
vessels has remained at a similar level without any big change. However, the number 
of vessels of Bare Boat Charter with Hire Purchase (BBC/HP) is increasing.  
Regarding the status of licensed and registered vessels in Korea, vessels sailing 
coastal waters are registered more than ocean-going vessels. The Table 6 represents 
the number of Korean vessels registered and licenced in 2015. The total number of 
ships was 3,824; the number of vessels operating in coastal waters was 2,225, and 
the number of ocean going vessels was estimated to be 1,599, so that the number of 
coastal vessels was higher. Furthermore, except other vessels such as tugs and 
barges, conventional cargo vessels were the most registered, followed by tankers. 
The conventional ships include general cargo ships and bulk carriers. Moreover, the 
number of Korean seafarers employed in Korea is 36,976 as shown in Table 7 below. 
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Table 6 Licensed and Registered Vessels in Korea 
(Unit: Number, Ton, TEU, 31 Dec, 2015) 
Kind of  
Ships 
Classifica
tion 
Total 
Passenger 
Vessels 
Conventional 
Cargo Vessels 
Container Ship Tankers Others 
Number 
of ships 
Gross Ton 
Number 
of ships 
Gross 
Ton 
Number 
of 
ships 
Gross Ton TEU 
Number 
of ships 
Gross Ton 
Number 
of ships 
Gross Ton 
Number 
of ships 
Gross Ton 
Total 3,824 64,924,680 145 97,273 1,105 
36,652,35
3 
1,215,766 316 
13,583,02
0 
662 
13,340,62
6 
1,596 
1,251,40
7 
Coastal 
Line 
2,225 1,972,190 145 97,273 265 536,049 - - - 246 252,025 1,569 
1,086,84
2 
Ocean-
going 
ship 
1,599 62,952,490 - - 840 
36,116,30
4 
1,215,766 316 
13,583,02
0 
416 
13,088,60
1 
27 164,565 
Liner 313 13,461,756 - - 1 7,589 1,207,263 312 
13,454,16
7 
- - - - 
Irregular 
liner 
1,286 49,490,734 - - 839 
36,108,71
5 
8,503 4 128,853 416 
13,088,60
1 
27 164,565 
 Note: 1. Based on licensed and registered vessels  
       2. Passenger ships include reserve ships on subsided remote island route, and others 
include barges  
       3. Includes BBC/HP ships 
  Source: Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries(MOF), Shipping Policy Division  
 
 
Table 7 Status of the number of seafarers' employment in Korea 
(Unit: person, 31 Dec. 2015) 
Classification Employment of seafarers 
Foreign seafarers 
employed in Korea 
Total 36,976 24,624 
Korean 
Flag 
vessels 
Ocean going vessels 9,307 
12,066 
70 (passenger vessels) 
Costal vessels 7,847 673 
Ocean going fishing 
vessels 
1,492 3,374 
Coastal/inshore 
fishing vessels 
15,328 8,441 
Foreign flag vessels 3,001 - 
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According to the statistical yearbook of maritime and fisheries (MOF, 2016), the total 
number of domestic vessels registered in 2015 was 2,225, and there were 233 
accidents, which was 10.4 percent among the vessels. While 1,599 ocean-going 
vessels were registered in the same year, the accident rate was 6.7 percent. As a 
result, ocean-going vessels experienced 21 percent fewer accidents than domestic 
vessels. 
In light of the major causes of ship accidents, it can be ascertained that human 
errors are the major factors. Tables 10 and 11 show the causes of accidents that 
occurred in domestic and ocean-going vessels, judged by the Korea Maritime Safety 
Tribunal (KMST) from 2012 to 2016. There are also several causes of maritime 
accidents. Moreover, operational errors, such as improper maintenance of engine 
facilities and inappropriate safety procedures, are considered to belong to a category 
of human errors. While the rate of accidents caused by human error was 89.2 percent 
of 130 cases on ocean-going, as shown in Table 10, it was 93.2 percent of total 266 
cases on domestic vessels. Therefore, it is possible to say that maritime accidents 
are mainly caused by human error, and it is important to reduce the human errors and 
improve human factors to reduce maritime casualties. 
 
Table 8 Comparison of the ratio of accident between domestic vessels and 
ocean-going vessels 
 
The number of 
registered vessel 
The number of 
maritime accidents 
The Ratio of 
registered vessels 
to accidents 
Domestic vessels 2,225 233 10.4% 
Ocean-going 
vessels 
1,599 107 6.7% 
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Table 9 The ratio of the number of registered ships and maritime accidents  
 
Number 
Year 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
The number of registered 
vessels (A) 
84,466 80,647 77,730 76,500 - 
The number of ships 
involved in accidents (B) 
1,854 1,306 1,565 2,362 2,549 
The number of accidents 
1,573 1,093 1,330 2,101 2,307 
Maritime accidents 
occurrence rate (B/A) 
2.19% 1.62% 2.01% 3.09% - 
Source: Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF), Shipping Policy Division 
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Table 10 status of maritime casualties of ocean-going merchant vessels from 
2012 to 2016 (Accidents of which judgment were completed by the KMST) 
Type of ships 
 
Causes of marine accidents 
Passe
nger 
ship 
Cargo 
ship 
Tanker tug sum 
Operati
onal  
failures 
Violation of navigation laws and regulations 
for avoiding collisions 
 5 1 6 12 
Failure to comply with general principles for 
navigation such as look out, position fixing and 
keeping ships’ course  
3 34 18 3 58 
Inappropriate departure preparation such as 
securing openings, checking loading 
condition, charts and publications 
- - - - - 
Failure to comply with duty orders and 
inappropriate  report and taking over duties 
- 2 - 1 3 
Others  1 7 1 - 9 
Sum 4 48 20 10 82 
Inappropriate maintenance of engine facilities and 
spare part 
4 7 4 2 17 
Inappropriate safety actions for accident prevention on 
cargo, fishing and other onboard works 
- 6 11 - 17 
Inadequate working environments such as rest hours 
and measure for preventing dangers 
- - - - - 
Safety defects on engine structure and machinery parts 1 1 2 - 4 
Inadequate navigational facilities such as traffic routes 
and aids to navigation 
- - - - - 
Safety defects on electronic appliances and loading and 
unloading equipment 
1 1 2 - 4 
Deficiencies in ship safety management - - - - - 
Act of God - 3 - 1 4 
others - - 1 - 1 
Unknown of origins - 1 - - 1 
Sum 9 67 39 15 130 
Source: KMST (2016) 
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Table 11 status of maritime casualties of domestic merchant vessels from 
2012 to 2016 (Accidents of which judgment were completed by the KMST) 
Type of ships 
 
Causes of marine accidents 
Passe
nger 
ship 
Cargo 
ship 
Tanker tug sum 
Operati
onal  
failures 
Violation of navigation laws and regulations for 
avoiding collisions 
1 2 3 4 10 
Failure to comply with general principles for 
navigation such as look out, position fixing and 
keeping ships’ course  
23 31 22 60 136 
Inappropriate departure preparation such as 
securing openings, checking loading 
condition, charts and publications 
3 - - 3 6 
Failure to comply with duty orders and 
inappropriate  report and taking over duties 
1 1 1 3 6 
Others  3 - - - 3 
Sum 31 34 26 70 161 
Inappropriate maintenance of engine facilities and 
spare part 
36 5 4 6 51 
Inappropriate safety actions for accident prevention on 
cargo, fishing and other onboard works 
1 6 10 19 36 
Inadequate working environments such as rest hours and 
measure for preventing dangers 
- - - - - 
Safety defects on engine structure and machinery parts 2 - - 2 4 
Inadequate navigational facilities such as traffic routes 
and aids to navigation 
- - - 2 2 
Safety defects on electronic appliances and loading and 
unloading equipment 
1 1 - 2 4 
Deficiencies in ship safety management - - 1 4 5 
Act of God 1 1 - - 2 
others - - 1 - 1 
Unknown of origins - - - - - 
Sum 72 47 42 105 266 
Source: KMST (2016) 
 
Recently, serious marine accidents have been occurring in Korean territorial waters 
and the Ocean. On April 16, 2014, the ro-ro ferry, Sewol, capsized 3.1 miles off the 
southwest coast of Korea, resulting in 295 deaths and nine missing of 476 passengers. 
According to the safety investigation report of the KMST, the direct cause of the 
accident was the lack of stability of the ship so that a steep list occurred when the ship 
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was trying to change its course. However, immediately after the accident, the crew 
did not make enough effort to get passengers to evacuate the listing ship, resulting in 
many victims. Also, despite the suggestion of the captain, the company placed 
excessive cargo on the ship, usually in favour of operating profit rather than the safety 
of the ship (KMST 2014). This is considered to be due to a serious lack of safety 
culture because the management had focused on profitability rather than safety and 
had not been able to communicate properly with the crew members.  
 Another example of a major accident that occurred recently is the Wuysan oil spill 
accident, caused by an allision with an oil pipe at the Gwangyang oil terminal in Korea. 
On December 31, 2014, a VLCC, Wuysan, collided with GS-Caltex Crulde Oil Dolphin, 
which is the name of one of the berths at the terminal, due to failing to reduce its 
speed as it approached the quay according to the pilot's control for berthing. In the 
safety investigation report, the lack of communication between the captain and the 
pilot was pointed out as an underlying cause in the social and cultural aspect (KMST 
2015). 
 The occurrence of these major accidents has led to improvements in the maritime 
safety system of Korea through amendments of rules and regulations as shown in 
Table 12. However, it is doubtful that these strengthened legal systems are sufficient 
for maritime safety and prevention of human error. Since the subject of the 
implementation of the regime is ultimately the person, it is difficult to discipline human 
consciousness and beliefs only through the legal system. Therefore, focusing on 
safety culture and preparing measures to enhance human factors should be a direct 
path to maritime safety.  
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Table 12 Legal improvement after the Sewol accident  
edited by the author 
Name of the 
ship 
 
Subsequent 
improvements  
Improvements  
Title of  
relevant Law 
Ship’s facility 
- Strengthen performance standards for cargo 
securing devices for car ferries  
- 5 % of the maximum number of people on board 
the life vest near the muster station 
- Revision of ship’s structure for increase of cargo 
for car ferries 
- Mandatory installation of Voyage Data Recorder 
(VDR) for domestic passenger ships over 300 
gross ton 
- Standard of the 
structure and 
facilities of car 
ferry 
 
 
- Ships’ safety Act 
 
Crew 
qualification 
- Five-year cycle of job aptitude test for captain 
working in a car ferry 
- The captain and crew must not leave the ship until 
the passenger is rescued in an emergency. 
- Seafarer Act 
Management 
system 
- Strengthen master’s responsibilities on inspection 
of seaworthiness and report to the ship owner  
- Ship owner who is noticed with problems from the 
inspection shall take necessary measures to safely 
operate the ship 
- Seafarer Act 
Inspection 
- Introduction of maritime safety supervisor system 
(Unusual check for car ferries) 
- Strengthen passenger identification procedures 
- Maritime safety 
Act 
 
- Shipping Act 
Organisation 
- Revision of government organisation 
(Maritime Police Organization absorbed into the 
Ministry of Public Safety and Security) 
- 
Training 
- Establishment of passenger ship job and safety 
training  
- Seafarer Act 
32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Research method and design appropriateness 
 
Through the review of previous studies in chapter 2, qualitative and quantitative 
research methodologies have been used primarily for the evaluation of safety culture, 
or it has been studied in a combined way. This study is carried out by a quantitative 
method that enables information collection and data analysis in a short period and 
use of standardised research methods on the related topic. Therefore, it is said to be 
less risky as a traditional way. Furthermore, the safety climate represents the aspect 
of safety culture, so measuring cultural aspects of seafarers can reveal the level of 
safety culture.   
Meanwhile, in other industries such as aviation and nuclear power, research on 
safety climate has been carried out to improve safety culture since the 1990s. From 
the second half of 2000, several studies have evaluated the safety culture of maritime 
employees. However, in Korea, there are not enough studies on the safety culture of 
seafarers compared with other countries, and there is no study that verifies the 
correlation between the ISM Code and safety culture. 
Therefore, this study assesses the safety climate through a quantitative 
methodology, targeting seafarers to understand the level of safety culture in the 
Korean maritime sector. For the purpose of the study, a questionnaire was developed 
based on the factors of safety culture that were extracted from past studies. The study 
cited the five safety indicators from Weigman (2002) as a basis for developing a 
questionnaire and added two additional indicators required for the safety 
management system in the maritime field. These questions were also amended to fit 
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the seafarer. 
To evaluate the effect of the implementation of the ISM Code on the recognition of 
safety culture by seafarers, the survey, using the questionnaire, was administered to 
crews employed in ocean going vessels that are fully covered by the ISM Code and 
seafarers employed in domestic vessels that are covered by the safety management 
system in the Korean domestic Law. Furthermore, the questionnaire was developed 
to obtain a high level of reliability and validity to ensure that the safety culture of the 
seafarers could be measured properly through a quantitative method, utilising a 
survey tool. The survey data was analysed by using the SPSS for the exploratory 
factor analysis to verify the reliability and validity of the measurement tool.  
 
4.2 Research model  
 
To investigate the effectiveness of the ISM Code on enhancing safety culture, a 
survey on safety culture perceptions of seafarers was conducted. The following figure 
(Figure 4) is a research model to achieve the objective of the study. The survey target 
was divided into two groups that were comprised of seafarers working on ocean going 
vessels and those working on domestic ships. Based on the results of the survey, the 
perception of the seven safety culture indicators among the two groups of crew 
members was compared and analysed, and the effectiveness of the ISM Code on 
safety culture was evaluated.   
  
 
 
 
Figure 1 Concept of research model
  
4.3 Development of indicators for assessing safety culture 
 
The study requires the selection of proper indicators for safety cultural 
measurements, as the selection influences the validity of the survey result. As a result 
of reviewing the relevant literature in the previous Chapters, it was concluded that the 
indicators derived from the study of Wiegmann et al. (2003) were suitable as the 
safety indicators to be used in this study. This is because Wiegmann et al. (2003) had 
selected indicators based on a thorough review of sufficient literature on safety culture 
and safety climate. The author believes that these indicators comprehensively cover 
the various factors used in other studies (described in Table 3). In addition to the 
Wiegmann's indicators, two indicators of learning and communication supplemented 
the design of the questionnaire. Therefore, in this study, questionnaire items were 
constructed based on seven indicators which are “organisational commitment, 
management involvement, reward system, employee empowerment, reporting 
system, learning and communication” (Wiegmann et al., 2002, p.11). 
- Organisational commitment  
It is an indicator of the continued interest and support of management on safety, and 
whether safety is a core value in an organisation (Wiegmann et al. 2002). 
- Management involvement 
 It refers to the degree to which management and middle managers participate in 
safety activities, and means active monitoring (Wiegmann et al. 2002). 
- Reward system 
Whether a behaviour is a safe or an unsafe behaviour within an organisation, it is 
evaluated and given a reward or punishment consistently according to the 
evaluation (Wiegmann et al. 2002). 
- Employee empowerment 
It includes safety tasks as a way to prevent errors when employees work, the level 
of reflection of employees in the safety-related decisions, the pride of employees, 
and the responsibility for others (Wiegmann et al. 2002). 
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- Reporting system 
The reporting system allows members to be willing to report their mistakes or near 
misses and to share that information. (Wiegmann et al. 2002).  
- Learning 
It is a proactive approach to monitoring and acquiring information and acquiring 
knowledge from the organisation, and it is necessary to be willing to implement 
improvements. (Ostrom, Wilhelmsen, & Kaplan, 1993: Ek, 2006) 
- Communication 
It is to make good communication in everyday work for proper decision making. 
Clear communication must be performed especially for safety culture. (Glendon & 
Stanton, 2000; Ostrom et al., 1993: Ek, 2006) 
 
4.4 Relationship between factors of safety culture and ISM code 
 
Although the effectiveness of the ISM Code remains controversial, it has been 
found (IMO, 2005) to have a positive effect on safety culture. To understand the direct 
relationship between the ISM Code and safety culture, the contents of the eleven 
elements constituting the Code were examined and linked to the relevant factors of 
safety culture.  
As shown in Figure 5, the seven factors of safety culture were found to be 
associated with all elements of the Code without any separate concept. In this study, 
when the level of perception of the safety culture is quantitatively measured, the 
effectiveness of the ISM Code can be predicted in conjunction with the relationship. 
When the safety culture of the seafarers is highly perceived, the Code will be expected 
to be effective.  
Using the measurement tool of the study, the effectiveness of the Code can be 
analysed through comparing the level of perception of safety culture of seafarers 
employed in ocean going vessels, wherein the ISM Code is applied, to those 
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employed in domestic vessels, wherein the safety management system, the simplified 
version of the Code, is applied by Korean domestic Law.  
Using the measurement tools in this study, it is possible to analyse the effectiveness 
of the Code when the consciousness of safety culture of seafarers on ships that apply 
and do not apply the ISM Code is measured and compared. In particular, it is possible 
to recognise which safety factors have a positive effect on the Code.  
 
Figure 2 Relation between Safety culture factors and the ISM Code 
 
4.5 Research questions and hypotheses 
 
One of the major objectives of the ISM Code is to promote safety culture at sea. 
Although it is recognised that the implementation of the ISM Code has contributed to 
reducing maritime accidents, it is also true that substantial efforts were needed by 
seafarers and staff of shipping companies. At this point - approximately 20 years after 
the ISM Code was enforced in shipping - it would be necessary to see how the Code 
has contributed to enhancing safety culture and how it affects human behaviour.  
According to the ICS (2013), safety culture can improve effectively human 
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behaviour through the implementation of an SMS appropriately. Furthermore, the 
IMO’s position is that safety culture and safety management are rooted in seafarer’s 
professionalism (Havold, 2010). Therefore, to reduce human error, which is the 
leading cause of accidents on ships, it is the best way for the seafarers to perform 
safety management with professionalism based on safety culture. 
The fundamental research question is whether the implementation of the ISM Code 
has a positive impact on the safety culture. If the ISM Code contributes to promoting 
safety culture, seafarers aboard ships on which the ISM Code is applied would have 
a higher awareness of it than those on domestic ships. Under these assumptions, the 
main hypothesis was formulated as ‘the perception of the safety culture of seafarers 
employed in international sailing vessels is higher than that of seafarers engaged in 
domestic vessels”. Furthermore, the sub-hypotheses to be proved in this study are as 
detailed in Table 13:   
 Table 13 Seven hypotheses 
H1 The awareness of organisational commitment of seafarers employed on 
ocean going vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on domestic vessels. 
H2 The awareness of management involvement of seafarers employed on 
ocean going vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on domestic vessels. 
H3 The awareness of reward system of seafarers of seafarers employed on 
ocean going vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on domestic vessels. 
H4 The awareness of employ empowerment of seafarers employed on ocean 
going vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on domestic vessels. 
H5 The awareness of reporting system of seafarers employed on ocean going 
vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on domestic vessels. 
H6 The awareness of learning of seafarers employed on ocean going vessels 
will be higher than that of seafarers on domestic vessels. 
H7 The awareness of the communication of seafarers employed on ocean going 
vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on domestic vessels. 
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4.6 Design of the questionnaire 
 
To measure the safety climate of seafarers, the safety culture indicators and 
questionnaire items selected through literature review were revised and edited to fit 
the maritime crews. Meanwhile, considering the busy schedules of seafarers, a short 
questionnaire was required. Therefore, the questionnaire was comprised of 43 
questions because it was necessary to survey the seafarers who were temporarily 
trained for a short period. Since seafarers are the subject of the implementation of the 
Code, the questionnaire was targeted at merchant officers, including captains and 
chief engineers and excluded members of rating and other departments such as the 
cooking department. 
The studies of Wiegmann et al. (2003) and KTSA (2008) were utilised to develop 
the questionnaire items but modified to fit the maritime context. In addition, related to 
the learning and communication indicators, which were added, the relevant questions 
were prepared using the items that were developed in other studies (ABS, 2012; Song, 
2014). 
The response was chosen from the 5-point Likert scale, with one as "not at all" and 
five as "very agree". Questions by indicators are arranged randomly in the 
questionnaire, and to increase the reliability of the response, some of the items were 
prepared as negative statements. The survey items are attached in the Appendix B of 
this dissertation.  
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5. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Demographic characteristics of respondents  
 
  The survey was conducted from July 20, 2017 to August 18, 2017 at a training 
institute in Korea. Seafarers in active service were targeted, and 261 respondents 
replied. Excluding the unanswered questionnaires, the questionnaires of 208 
respondents were utilised for the analysis. The general characteristics of the 
respondents are described in Table 14. 
Table 14 General characteristic of the respondents 
Division 
Ocean going ships Coastal ships Total 
No Percent No Percent No Percent 
Total number of respondents 126 60.6 82 39.4 208 100 
Gender 
Female 5 55.6 4 44.4 9 4.3 
Male 121 60.8 78 39.2 199 95.7 
Rank 
Senior officers 59 51.8 55 44.4 114 54.8 
Junior officers 67 71.3 27 39.2 94 45.2 
Years 
of 
service 
1-4 years 61 77.2 18 22.8 79 38.0 
5-9 years 22 73.3 8 26.7 30 14.4 
10-14 years 7 43.8 9 56.3 16 7.7 
15-19 years 12 66.7 6 33.3 18 8.7 
20 – 24 years 9 47.4 10 52.6 19 9.1 
More than 25 years 15 32.6 31 67.4 46 22.1 
Type of  
ship 
Container 14 82.4 3 17.6 17 8.2 
Bulk carrier 18 94.7 1 5.3 19 9.1 
Tanker 24 75.0 8 25.0 32 15.4 
LNG carrier 10 100.0 0 0.0 10 4.8 
Passenger ship 9 27.3 24 72.7 33 15.9 
Car carrier 4 100.0 0 0.0 4 1.9 
General cargo 16 53.3 14 46.7 30 14.4 
Chemical carrier 18 75.0 6 25.0 24 11.5 
Others 13 33.3 26 66.7 39 18.8 
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All respondents selected were officers, including captains and chief engineers who 
are working as managers on vessels. Furthermore, the respondents were 
distinguished as seafarers aboard vessels engaged on international voyages (ocean-
going seafarers) and seafarers aboard vessels engaged on domestic voyages 
(domestic-sailing seafarers). 126 ocean-going seafarers accounted for 60.6 percent 
of the total respondents, while 82 domestic sailing seafarers (39. 4 percent) replied. 
Regarding gender, only 4.3 percent of the respondents were female officers, which 
accounted for a negligible portion.  
Regarding the rank, the survey was targeted at both deck officers and engine 
officers. Senior officers such as captains, chief engineers, chief officers and 1st 
engineers replied, accounting for 54 percent of the total, while junior officers including 
2nd officers, 2nd engineers, 3rd officers and 3rd engineers accounted for 45 percent. 
Therefore, the response rate of the higher ranking officers was higher than that of 
junior officers.  
In addition, except for 79 of the respondents (38 percent of respondents), the 
remaining respondents have more than five years of work experience, so their work 
experience seems to be abundant. The majority of respondents were engaged on 
passenger ships, tankers and general cargo ships. In addition, 39 respondents were 
engaged on other ships, which include tugboats, and cable laying ships. 
 
5.2 Reliability and validity of measurement instruments 
 
When designing questionnaires and conducting statistical analyses, the reliability 
and validity of these measures are considered important for the study. Reliability 
analysis is a process required to show the accuracy of the measurement tool, and it 
is a process of confirming whether it is accurate and consistently measured by a 
survey respondent. Validity also indicates whether a tool is measuring the concept 
(Song, 2015).  
First, for the reliability measurement, the value of the Cronbach α for internal 
consistency is widely used in studies, and a value of 0.6 or more is considered to be 
reliable. Therefore, through exploratory factor analysis, the Cronbach α Coefficient for 
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each of the items classified by the same factor was identified in the results of the 
rotated component matrix by Varimax. The items with low reliability were removed 
from all the items, and the measurement was repeated, confirming that all factors 
satisfied the reliability test. In the initial 43 items, exploratory factor analysis and 
reliability analysis were performed. After removing six items that were considered to 
be problematic in reliability, the Cronbach α value of all items was found to be 0.6 or 
higher as shown in Table 15.  
Table 15 Reliability of measurement items 
Items 
Indicators 
Items Delated items Final items Cronbach α 
Organisational 
Commitment 
Q6, Q3, Q5, Q13, 
Q1, Q12, Q43, 
Q17 
- 
Q6, Q3, Q5, Q13, 
Q1, Q12, Q43, 
Q17 
.93 
Management 
Involvement 
Q4, Q7, Q18, Q19, 
Q22, Q23 
- 
Q4, Q7, Q18, 
Q19, Q22, Q23 
.86 
Reward system 
Q8, Q9, Q14, Q15, 
Q16 
Q8 
Q9, Q14, Q15, 
Q16 
.68 
Employee 
empowerment 
Q10, Q11, Q20, 
Q21, Q24, Q25, 
Q26 
Q10, Q24, Q26 
Q11, Q20, Q21, 
Q25 
.70 
Reporting system 
Q27, Q28, Q29, 
Q31, Q32, Q33, 
Q36 
- 
Q27, Q28, Q29, 
Q31, Q32, Q33, 
Q36 
.90 
Learning 
Q30, Q34, Q35, 
Q37, Q38 
Q30, Q38 Q34, Q35, Q37 .84 
Communication 
Q39, Q40, Q41, 
Q42, Q2 
- 
Q39, Q40, Q41, 
Q42, Q2 
.82 
Sum of the number 43 6 37 - 
 
For the purpose of verifying the validity of the measurement instrument, exploratory 
factor analysis was conducted. Principal component analysis was used to extract the 
constituent factors for the measurement variables, and the orthogonal rotation method 
(Varimax) was adopted to simplify factor loading, which refers to the correlation 
between each variable and factor. A value of factor loading of 0.4 or greater is 
considered a significant variable. Therefore, in this study, items were constructed 
based on seven common factors through principal component analysis, and items 
with factor loading value of 0.4 or higher were selected. Among 43 items, one item 
was removed from the Reward system, three items from the Employee empowerment, 
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and two items from Learning were removed, and 37 items were finally selected.  
The value of Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) is a measure of the degree to which the 
correlation between variables is explained by other variables. This is used to verify 
the suitability of the factor analysis and indicates that a value of 0.8 or higher is 
favourable (Song, 2014: Song, 2015). The results of this study showed that the KMO 
value was 0.928 and the selection of the variables was satisfactory. As a result of 
Bartlett's sphere formation test, the significance probability was less than 0.01, and 
the factor analysis model was found to be suitable. 
. 
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Table 16 Result of the exploratory factor analysis 
Factor Items Loading factor 
Commonalitie
s 
Eigen 
value 
Variance 
Organizational  
commitment 
Q6 .819 .764 
5.660 15.298 
Q3 .788 .710 
Q5 .780 .653 
Q13 .774 .746 
Q1 .743 .724 
Q12 .736 .735 
Q43 .651 .723 
Q17 .642 .612 
Reporting 
System 
Q33 .772 .664 
4.568 12.346 
Q29 .751 .649 
Q28 .736 .684 
Q32 .708 .640 
Q27 .687 .680 
Q36 .643 .696 
Q31 .641 .657 
Management 
Involvement 
Q22 .716 .752 
3.797 10.263 
Q18 .682 .610 
Q7 .665 .652 
Q4 .649 .644 
Q19 .642 .546 
Q23 .601 .550 
Communication 
Q40 .784 .655 
3.339 9.025 
Q39 .739 .655 
Q42 .714 .667 
Q41 .666 .615 
Q2 .535 .485 
Employee  
empowerment 
Q20 .692 .585 
2.356 6.367 
Q11 .658 .616 
Q21 .620 .454 
Q25 .543 .520 
Learning 
Q34 .785 .733 
2.139 5.781 Q35 .684 .746 
Q37 .633 .748 
Reward System 
Q16 .750 .666 
2.083 5.630 
Q9 .670 .578 
Q14 .642 .637 
Q15 .563 .492 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 0.928 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 4433.675 
Sig. (p<0.001) 0.000 
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5.3 Data analysis of safety culture indicators 
 
5.3.1 Overall analysis of the survey result 
 
The mean values of safety culture perception of seafarers working on the ocean 
going vessels wherein the Code applied and the coastal going ships wherein the 
simplified Code applied by the domestic law was described as shown in Figure 6. 
Comparing the average values of perceptions of the seven factors of safety culture, 
the mean values of the ocean-going vessels and coastal going vessels were 3.50 and 
3.33, respectively. Therefore, the perception of the seafarers employed in ships 
engaged on international voyages is higher than the perception of the seafarers 
employed in ships engaged in coastal going voyages. Among the seven factors of 
safety culture, employee empowerment was the highest in both groups, while the 
lowest factors were organisational commitment (3.33) in the group of seafarers 
employed in ocean-going vessels and reporting system (2.99) in the group of 
seafarers employed in domestic vessels. 
 
Figure 3 Comparisons of perception on safety culture indicators 
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Table 17 Comparisons of perception on safety culture indicators 
Divisions 
Mean Std. Deviation 
Ocean-going Coastal Ocean-going Coastal 
Organisational Commitment 3.33 3.06 0.84 0.82 
Reporting System 3.36 2.90 0.80 0.69 
Management Involvement 3.38 3.11 0.74 0.81 
Communication 3.57 3.49 0.67 0.77 
Employee Empowerment 4.11 4.13 0.65 0.70 
Learning 3.88 3.50 0.74 0.78 
Reward System 3.55 3.15 0.48 0.69 
Average  3.60 3.33  0.70 0.75 
 
5.3.2 Comparative analysis of average value of safety culture indicators  
 
Comparing the mean difference on each safety culture factor between the two 
groups, the remaining six safety culture factors, except employee empowerment, 
showed that the perception of seafarers on board ocean going vessels was higher 
than the perception of those on domestic ships as shown in Figure 7. Among the 
indicators that were above the overall mean value (0.26), the most significant 
difference was the reporting system (0.45), followed by the Reward system (0.41), 
0.45
0.41
0.38
0.26 0.27
0.08
-0.01
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Mean difference between ocean-going seafarers and costal going seafarers
Mean of all differences
Figure 4 Mean differences of safety culture indicators 
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Learning (038), Organizational Commitment (0.27), and Management Involvement 
(0.26). Therefore, reporting, reward system, learning, organisational commitment, and 
management involvement among all safety culture factors could be deemed to be the 
five factors of safety culture that have the greatest influence from the application of 
the Code.  
 
5.3.3 Analysis of the correlation of the safety culture indicators  
 
A correlation analysis was conducted with the safety culture average (3.49) and 
each of the seven safety factors to identify the correlation between the safety culture 
and all its factors as shown in Table 18. In the analysis, the closer the value is to ±1, 
the higher the correlation has. The closer to 0, the lower the correlation. In general, 
if the value is 0.5 or more, the correlation is higher (KTSA, 2008).  
 Table 18 Correlation analysis of the safety factor and the seven factors 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Safety 
Culture 
Organisational 
Commitment 
Reporting 
System 
Management 
Involvement 
Communi
-cation 
Reward 
System  
Employee 
Empowerment 
Learning 
Safety 
Culture 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1        
 Sig. (2-tailed)         
Organisational 
Commitment 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.771** 1       
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000        
Reporting 
System 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.775** .595** 1      
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000       
Management 
Involvement 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.791** .634** .646** 1     
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000      
Communi-
cation 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.695** .359** .413** .431** 1    
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000     
Reward 
System 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.571** .408** .302** .372** .260** 1   
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000    
Employee 
Empowerment 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.615** .284* .312** .294** .520** .318** 1  
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000   
Learning Pearson 
Correlation 
.769** .481** .528** .510** .525** .324** .447** 1 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
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Each sub-index showed a high correlation with the average (3.49) of the safety 
culture, which indicates that each sub-index is well represented as an element of 
safety culture (KTSA, 2008). In particular, the correlation between safety culture and 
management involvement (0.791) was the most correlated. It can be said that 
management’s interest and involvement are closely related to safety culture. 
Furthermore, management involvement was closely correlated with reporting system 
(0.646), which had a significant difference between the two groups.  
 
5.4 Hypothesis testing 
 
To test the hypothesis that ocean-going seafarers' awareness of maritime safety 
culture is higher than that of coastal going seafarers, an analysis was conducted by 
using an independent-sampled t-test on each indicator of maritime safety culture as 
shown in Table 19.  
As a result of the t-test for the total safety culture (the average of the seven factors) 
and the seven sub-indicators, there was statistically a significant difference in the 
overall perception of safety culture according to the navigational area (p <0.01). In 
other words, there was a difference in the perception of safety culture of the seafarers 
of ocean-going vessels and domestic vessels, and the perception of those on ocean 
going ships is higher than that of those on domestic ships.  
 
Table 19 the result of independent sampled t-test analysis 
Divisions 
Mean Std. Deviation 
t p 
Ocean
-going 
Coastal 
Ocean-
going 
Coastal 
Safety culture 3.60 3.33 0.55 0.46 3.599 .000 
Organisational Commitment 3.33 3.06 0.84 0.82 2.304 .022 
Management Involvement 3.38 3.11 0.74 0.81 2.535 .012 
Reward System 3.55 3.15 0.48 0.69 4.984 .000 
Employee empowerment 4.11 4.13 0.65 0.70 -.147 .884 
Reporting System 3.36 2.90 0.80 0.69 4.200 .000 
Learning 3.88 3.50 0.74 0.78 3.504 .001 
Communication 3.57 3.49 0.67 0.77 .789 .431 
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There were no statistically significant differences (P> 0.05) in communication and 
employee empowerment factors among the seven indicators of maritime safety 
culture between two groups.  
On the other hand, the perception of the safety culture at sea was different between 
the two groups regarding organizational commitment, reporting system, management 
involvement, learning and reward system, and seafarers of ocean-going vessels had 
a high perception (p <0.05).  
According to the result of the T-test, the hypothesis H1 that the recognition of the 
crew employed on vessels engaged in international voyages of organisational 
commitment is higher than that of those engaged on domestic vessels was adopted 
as p <0.05 (p = 0.022) and t = 2.304. Hypothesis H2 on the management involvement 
was adopted as p <0.05 (p = 0.12) and t = 2.535. Hypothesis H3 about reward system 
was adopted as p <0.01 (p = 0.000) and t = 4.984. However, hypothesis H4 about 
employee empowerment was rejected with p> 0.05 (p = 0.884) and t value with -0.147. 
Meanwhile, hypothesis H5 about reporting system was adopted as t value of 4.200 
for p <0.01 (p = 0.000) and hypothesis H6 about learning was adopted for p <0.01 (p 
= 0.001) and t value of 3.504. Finally, hypothesis H7 on communication was rejected 
as p> 0.05 (p = 0.431) and t value as 0.789. The results of the hypotheses verification 
are shown in Table 20 below. 
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Table 20 Testing hypotheses 
No The description of the Hypothesis 
Result of 
t-test 
H1 
The awareness of organisation commitment of seafarers 
employed on ocean going vessels will be higher than that of 
seafarers on domestic vessels. 
Adoption 
H2 
The awareness of management involvement of seafarers 
employed on ocean going vessels will be higher than that of 
seafarers on domestic vessels. 
Adoption 
H3 
The awareness of reward system of seafarers of seafarers 
employed on ocean going vessels will be higher than that of 
seafarers on domestic vessels. 
Adoption 
H4 
The awareness of employ empowerment of seafarers employed 
on ocean going vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on 
domestic vessels. 
Dismissal 
H5 
The awareness of reporting system of seafarers employed on 
ocean going vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on 
domestic vessels. 
Adoption 
H6 
The awareness of learning of seafarers employed on ocean going 
vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on domestic vessels. 
Adoption 
H7 
The awareness of the communication of seafarers employed on 
ocean going vessels will be higher than that of seafarers on 
domestic vessels. 
Dismissal 
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5.5 Summary of the main results 
 
The basic research question in this study is whether the implementation of the ISM 
Code (the Code) positively affects the safety culture awareness of seafarers. To find 
the answer, seafarers’ consciousness about safety culture was investigated, and the 
result of the survey are as follows.  
 
i) Dimensions for measuring safety culture  
To develop a tool for measuring the safety culture perception of seafarers, the five 
factors of safety culture were found based on the study of Weigmann (2003) among 
research cases in aviation. Two factors related to the ISM Code and maritime safety 
culture were added to these, and a total of seven safety culture factors were derived. 
- As a result, the following were obtained: organizational commitment, management 
involvement, reporting system, employee empowerment, reward system, learning, 
and communication. Forty-three questionnaire items for safety culture 
measurement were selected according to these factors. 
 
ii) Relationship between ISM Code and safety culture 
As shown in Figure 5 in Chapter 4, all safety culture factors were closely related to 
the elements of the ISM Code, as a result of analyzing the correlation between the 
elements of the Code and the seven safety culture factors derived. Therefore, if the 
level of safety culture consciousness is high, the implementation of the ISM Code will 
be considered effective. 
 
iii) Results of the survey 
 As a result of analyzing the level of seafarers' perception of safety culture between 
the two groups, there were significant differences in five of the safety culture factors, 
except for employee empowerment and communication. The seafarers' awareness 
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level of the safety culture of ocean-going ships was higher than that of those on 
domestic vessels.  
- The difference was most significant in the perception of reporting system between 
seafarers in ocean-going vessels and those in domestic ships. Reward system, 
learning, organizational commitment, and management involvement also showed a 
significant difference between the two groups.  
- Both groups had the highest level of perception of employee empowerment among 
the safety culture factors with a score of 4.0 or higher. 
- As a result of correlation analysis between safety culture and its seven factors, it 
was found that safety culture has the highest correlation with management 
involvement. 
 
iv) The result based on the t-test to verify hypotheses was acquired as shown in 
Table 19. 
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Discussion of the findings 
 
The main points of this study will be examined based on the results of the 
hypotheses verification. 
First, they are related to whether the ISM Code is effective in the promotion of safety 
culture. Since the implementation of the Code, various studies have been conducted 
on its effectiveness. The IMO (2004) and Lappalaine (2016) found that the 
implementation of the Code had a positive impact on the formation of a good safety 
culture. Through this study, it was quantitatively proved that the safety culture 
perception of seafarers on vessels to which the Code is applied is significantly higher 
than that of seafarers onboard domestic vessels. Since safety culture and the ISM 
system are closely related, it was confirmed that the Code had a positive effect on 
promoting safety culture. 
Second, regarding the survey results of the seven factors of safety culture, there 
were significant differences in the reporting system, reward, and learning system 
between both groups at the significance level compared with the overall mean 
difference. It also showed that management involvement and organizational 
commitment had significant differences. However, there was no significant difference 
in employee empowerment and communication. Therefore, it can be seen that the 
ISM Code positively affects safety culture, especially the reporting system, reward 
system, learning, management involvement, and organizational commitment among 
the safety culture factors. Nevertheless, studies of the impact of the Code also pointed 
to weakness in employee empowerment and communication. Bhattacharya (2009) 
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found that since the implementation of ISM, there has been a lack of communication 
related to safety issues between shore and ship and that the Code has not had a 
significant effect on communication. Furthermore, Bhattacharya (2012) indicated that 
“employee participation in the management of shipboard safety were largely absent 
in the maritime context.” As a result, it is proven quantitatively that the effectiveness 
of the ISM Code on employee empowerment and communication is not significant. 
Therefore, the ISM Code affects partially the promotion of safety culture. 
Third, in relation to the suitability of the survey tool for safety culture measurement, 
the results obtained in this study and the results of other studies on safety culture 
measurements performed in the aeronautical field are compared, although the validity 
and reliability of the tool were already examined in Chapter 5. When comparing the 
results of the study of KTSA (2008) based on the five factors of safety culture 
(Weigmann et al., 2002) and the average of the result of this study (3.41), the average 
value of the perception of safety culture of aviation pilots working in Korean airlines 
was measured to be 3.40, and that of American pilots was measured to be 3.60. 
Similar results were obtained when compared with the aeronautical measurement 
results. Therefore, it is considered that the safety culture measurement tool applied in 
this study is appropriate.  
Fourth, through the analysis of the correlation between factors of safety culture, it 
was confirmed that management involvement and reporting system are the most 
influential factors in safety culture. Management's interest and participation in ship 
operations and safety activities will be the most important factor in promoting ship 
safety culture. This is also consistent with the study of KTSA (2008), which identified 
management involvement as an important factor in building a good safety culture. 
Meanwhile, in relation to the reporting system, there should be an atmosphere that 
encourages reporting of the errors and problems in the ship voluntarily and without 
difficulties at the employee level. 
Finally, regarding the level of recognition of safety culture of Korean seafarers, 
employee empowerment was the highest among factors of safety culture, and there 
was no significant difference in the perceptions of the seafarers. Employee 
empowerment is mainly the responsibility of the seafarers and the fulfilment of 
authorities. According to Kim (2013), the characteristics of Korean seafarers were 
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basically "affection to others," and Confucian customs have a great influence on the 
consciousness of the seafarer. In other words, it is a characteristic of Korean seafarers 
that hierarchical order is emphasized. The results of the survey showed that these 
characteristics were well demonstrated. The items with a score of 4.0 or higher were 
“I want to be respected by other crews through safety activities” and “I have to do 
everything I can to prevent accidents.” Employee empowerment relates to the unique 
national character of Koreans, and the evaluation result is considered to be of a high 
level. Therefore, it can be seen that the dominant safety culture characteristic of 
Korean seafarers is employee empowerment resulting from a strong sense of 
responsibility. 
 
6.2 Conclusion 
 
This study began with questions in the relevant academic dispute over the 
effectiveness of the ISM Code on safety culture. To prove the proposition that the ISM 
Code has a positive effect on safety culture, a qualitative study was conducted. Since 
the development of a scale to measure seafarer perception of safety culture was 
required, the concept of safety culture and safety climate and the factors for forming 
a good safety culture were explored. In this process, it was possible to select the 
seven factors of safety culture, which are organizational commitment, management 
involvement, employee empowerment, reporting system, learning, reward system, 
and communication. The questionnaire items were developed to target seafarers 
through a review of past literature and research. In addition, an analysis of the 
relationship between the elements of the ISM Code and factors of safety culture was 
conducted, and it was confirmed that these seven safety culture factors are closely 
related to elements in the ISM Code. 
In the result of the survey of Korean seafarers, the perception of safety culture of 
seafarers engaged in ocean-going vessels where the ISM Code applied is higher than 
that of those in domestic vessels where the simplified ISM Code is applied. There 
were significant differences in recognition among the safety factors except for two: 
employee empowerment and communication. For the five factors that differed, the 
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seafarers on international vessels had higher perception than those on domestic 
vessels. In particular, the reporting system, reward system, and learning showed great 
differences between the two groups, and the ISM Code was found to be the most 
effective for these factors. As for employee participation and communication, there 
was no difference between the two groups, and it was found that the ISM Code was 
not effective for these factors. This is consistent with other studies (Bhattacharya, 
2012; Lappalainen, 2016). Furthermore, among the safety culture factors, it is 
possible to recognize that the unique characteristics of Korean seafarers are 
employee empowerment, which means active participation in safety-related 
shipboard work and employee responsibility for safety.  
Through this study, it will be possible to establish measures to promote safety 
culture. As the rate of Korean domestic vessel accidents is higher than that of 
international voyages, it is necessary to identify vulnerable elements of safety culture 
and strengthen safety management. Based on the results of the study, a more 
effective way to promote safety culture would be if the maritime education system and 
safety management system related to the reporting system and the reward system, 
which have low recognition levels compared to seafarers working on international 
vessels, would be improved.  
To prevent maritime accidents, efforts should be made to improve maritime safety 
culture. Furthermore, it is necessary to grasp the level of awareness of the present 
safety culture so that more concrete improvement measures will be prepared. In the 
meantime, safety culture has been recognized, and safety systems and regulations 
have been improved following the occurrence of major disasters. What is required for 
safety enhancement is an empirical study on safety culture with a concrete approach. 
Through this study, appropriate tools for maritime safety culture measurement were 
developed for seafarers. This study was able to quantitatively measure the perception 
of safety culture, meaning that the effectiveness of the ISM Code on safety culture 
can be verified as an empirical study. 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
6.3 Limitation and further studies  
 
In this study, the seafarers were classified into two groups: those employed in 
vessels sailing on international voyages and those employed in ships sailing on 
domestic voyages. However, Zohar (2000) suggested that when measuring safety 
culture, a single organization or a group should be analyzed or compared. Chouhry, 
Fang and Mohamed (2007) noted that safety culture research needs to be aware of 
whether selected groups or organizational levels truly represent natural groups with a 
relatively homogeneous culture. As safety culture is based on the common 
consciousness of the members of an organization, a limitation of this study is that 
seafarers belonging to various ship types and shipping companies are set as one 
group. In a follow-up study, it is necessary to develop a safety culture measurement 
method by narrowing the research subjects to one organization or one ship type.  
In addition, this study evaluated the consciousness level of safety culture of the 
crew quantitatively through questionnaires. As a result, the interpretation of the 
questionnaire could not be conducted through in-depth interviews with the same 
seafarers who responded to the questionnaire. For a comprehensive conceptual 
approach to studying safety culture, qualitative research methods should be carried 
out with quantitative research methods (Guldenmund, 2000). Therefore, in future 
research, it will be necessary to introduce the interview technique in parallel with 
questionnaires to get more in-depth results. 
The third issue is related to whether the ISM Code is the only factor that creates a 
difference in the safety culture consciousness level of seafarers. In reality, there are 
many potential complexities for seafarers regarding education level, salary level, 
welfare level, and job consciousness. In this study, there is a limitation that only the 
navigation area is classified, and only matters concerning the application of the ISM 
Code are evaluated. 
Future research will need to study how to use the results of safety culture 
measurement. To promote safety culture effectively, it is necessary to conduct further 
studies to develop the methods to be applied to the ships, for instance, promotions, 
education, and training system. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Survey result arranged by indicators 
 
Questionnaire items 
Mean 
Ocean Coastal 
 
Q.1 Following safety procedures is consistently expected. 3.94 3.38 
 Q.3 Management doesn’t show much concern for safety until there 
is an accident or incident.* 
3.45 2.95 
 
Q.5 If work is busy, safety work may not work well.* 3.05 2.94 
Organisational  
commitment 
Q.6 Management tries to get around safety requirements 
whenever they get a chance.* 
3.37 3.13 
 Q.12 Management is willing to invest money and effort to improve 
safety. 
3.34 3.13 
 Q.13 Management is more concerned with making money than 
being safe.* 
2.94 2.78 
 Q.17 My company does not cut corners where safety is concerned. 3.22 2.99 
Q.43 Management does all it can to prevent accidents or incidents. 3.35 3.18 
Average 3.33 3.06 
Management 
involvement 
Q.4. Management involvement in safety issues has a high priority 
at my company. 
3.55 3.17 
Q.7 My company’s safety department is doing a good job. 3.52 3.13 
Q.18 Upper level management gets personally involved in safety 
activities. 
2.95 2.85 
Q.19 Safety standards are seldom discussed openly.* 3.33 3.13 
Q.22 Management is receptive to learning about safety concerns. 3.79 3.27 
Q.23 Managers does not hesitate to approach masters or crew 
members to discuss safety issues. 
3.15 3.07 
Average 3.38 3.11 
Reward 
system 
Q9 Management negatively evaluates crew members who behave 
recklessly. 
3.90 3.38 
Q14 Safe crew members’ performance is evaluated using clear 
standards. 
3.43 3.21 
Q15. Crew members who cause accidents or incidents are not 
held sufficiently accountable for their actions.* 
3.31 2.87 
Q.16 Action is consistently taken against crew members who 
violate safety procedures or rules. 
3.56 3.13 
Average 3.55 3.15 
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 Questionnaire items 
Mean 
Ocean Coastal 
Employee 
empowerm
ent 
Q11. The best officer or master or chief engineer in the group expect 
other crews to behave safely. 
4.08 4.15 
Q20. Crews do all they can to prevent accidents. 4.37 4.32 
Q21. Management ensures that all crews are responsible and 
accountable for safe operation. 
3.88 3.84 
Q25. It is important for me to operate safely if I am to keep the respect 
of other crews in my ship. 
4.11 4.20 
Average 4.04 4.12 
Reporting 
system 
Q27. I am familiar with the system for formally reporting safety issues 
in my company.  
3.64 3.16 
Q28. Safety issues raised by crews are communicated regularly to 
all crews in the company. 
3.82 3.12 
Q29. Crews hesitate to report minor injuries and incidents.* 3.00 2.57 
Q31. When a crew member reports a safety problem, management 
acts quickly to correct safety issues.  
3.41 3.00 
Q32. Crews who raise safety concerns are seen as troublemakers.* 3.47 2.94 
Q33. There is no point in reporting a near miss.* 2.87 2.48 
Q36. I am satisfied with the way this company deals with safety 
reports. 
3.28 3.06 
Average 3.36 2.90 
Learning 
Q34. I think support for education is very valuable. 
Q35. The issue of safety is shared by all crew members as a best 
practice through review and analysis. 
Q37. Safety system (issues) is improved based on past experiences, 
news related the safety issue or recognized solution. 
4.26 3.76 
3.76 
 
3.62 
3.44 
 
3.32 
Average 3.88 3.50 
Communic
ation 
Q2. There is good communication on this ship about safety issues. 3.72 3.57 
Q39. I always give proper instructions when I initiate any work. 3.67 3.60 
Q40. I can tell my straightforward thoughts without fear of being 
subjected to retaliatory measures. 
3.30 3.32 
Q41. I always ask questions if I do not understand the instructions 
given to me, or I am unsure of the relevant safety precautions. 
3.76 3.54 
Q42 There is mutual trust between the manager and crew based on 
honesty and truthfulness. 
3.37 3.40 
Average 3.57 3.49 
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Appendix B 
Questionnaire 
This is a questionnaire for measuring the climate on board. All materials will be used 
for research purposes and will be anonymized. Therefore, please read the question, 
and I would appreciate it if you would like to be honest. 
 
 
<Personal information>  
1. What is your rank? 
□ Captain        □ Chief Officer      □ 2nd Officer     □ 3rd Officer  
□ Chief Engineer  □ 1st Engineer      □ 2nd Engineer    
□ 3rd Engineer    □ Others (                                ) 
 
2. Gender 
□ Female                          □ Male 
3. Type of ships 
Container       □   Bulk carrier  □   Oil tanker     □    LNG carrier □ 
Passenger ship  □   Car carrier  □ General cargo □  
Chemical carrier  □ others   □ 
 
4. Navigational service area 
Ocean going voyage □                      Domestic voyage □  
5. Years of work experience at sea 
(                                        )years 
6. Ship tonnage – the latest ship 
100- 499 G/T    □       500 – 1000 G/T  □       1000- 2000 G/T   □ 
2000- 5000 G/T  □       5000-10000 G/T □       10000 – 30000 G/T □ 
30000- G/T      □ 
7. Have you experienced an accident or incident?  Yes □       No □    
8. Have you experienced a near miss?            Yes □       No □ 
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Please answer the following questions, by checking one 
number from one to five. 
Disagr
ee 
Disagr
ee 
slightl
y 
Netual 
Agree 
slightl
y 
Agr
ee 
1 Following safety procedures is consistently 
expected. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
2 There is good communication on this ship about 
safety issues. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
3 Management doesn’t show much concern for 
safety until there is an accident or incident. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
4 Management involvement in safety issues has a 
high priority at my company. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
5 If work is busy, safety work may not work well. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
6 Management tries to get around safety 
requirements whenever they get a chance. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
7 My company’s safety department is doing a good 
job. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
8 Being involved in an accident or incident has an 
adverse effect on a seafarer’s future with this 
company.  
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
9 Management negatively evaluates crew members 
who behave recklessly. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
10 Crew members are seldom asked for input when 
safety procedures or other guideline are 
developed or changed.* 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
11 The best officer or master or chief engineer in the 
group expect other crews to behave safely. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
12 Management is willing to invest money and effort 
to improve safety.  
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
13 Management is more concerned with making 
money than being safe. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
14 Safe crew members’ performance is evaluated 
using clear standards.  
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
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15 Crew members who cause accidents or incidents 
are not held sufficiently accountable for their 
actions. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
16 Action is consistently taken against crew members 
who violate safety procedures or rules. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
17 My company does not cut corners where safety is 
concerned. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
18 Upper level management gets personally involved 
in safety activities.  
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
19 Safety standards are seldom discussed openly. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
20 Crews do all they can to prevent accidents. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
21 Management ensures that all crews are 
responsible and accountable for safe operation. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
22 Management is receptive to learning about safety 
concerns. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
23 Managers does not hesitate to approach masters 
or crew members to discuss safety issues. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
24 Crews try to get around safety requirements 
whenever they get a chance. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
25 It is important for me to operate safely if I am to 
keep the respect of other crews in my ship. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
26 Crews often encourage one another to work safely. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
27 I am familiar with the system for formally reporting 
safety issues in my company. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
28 Safety issues raised by crews are communicated 
regularly to all crews in the company. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
29 Crews hesitate to report minor injuries and 
incidents. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
30 Crews are given enough training to perform their 
work safely. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
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31 When a crew member reports a safety problem, 
management acts quickly to correct safety issues. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
32 Crews who raise safety concerns are seen as 
troublemakers. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
33 There is no point in reporting a near miss. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
34 I think support for education is very valuable. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
35 The issue of safety is shared by all crew members 
as a best practice through review and analysis. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
36 I am satisfied with the way this company deals with 
safety reports.  
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
37 Safety system (issues) is improved based on past 
experiences, news related the safety issue or 
recognized solution. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
38 If you have reported concerns on ship’s safety, you 
feel measures are not taken within reasonable 
time 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
39 I always give proper instructions when I initiate any 
work. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
40 I can tell my straightforward thoughts without fear 
of being subjected to retaliatory measures. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
41 I always ask questions if I do not understand the 
instructions given to me, or I am unsure of the 
relevant safety precautions. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
42 There is mutual trust between the manager and 
crew based on honesty and truthfulness. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
43 Management does all it can to prevent accidents 
or incidents ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
